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(Still) “Unsafe at Any Speed”1:
Why Not Jail for Auto Executives?
Rena Steinzor*
I. “THE YEAR OF THE RECALL” 2
In 2014, the manufacturers of motor vehicles sold in America recalled
sixty-four million vehicles, an astounding number that represented about
forty-five percent of all passenger cars registered in 2012, the last year for
which numbers are available, and that also exceeded the combined total of
cars recalled during the previous three years.3 The momentum for this bad
run began to build in 2009 when motorists reported sudden acceleration
problems with Toyota cars, a brand that had been the gold standard for
safety.4 Motorists’ anxiety escalated when General Motors (GM) admitted
that faulty ignition switches could cause its compact cars to stall if drivers
brushed their key chains with their knees, disabling both the power steering
and air bags.5 The final straw was the discovery that air bags manufactured
by the Takata Corporation, which dominates the U.S. market for that essen-
tial part, could shoot shrapnel into people’s faces upon deployment.6
1 This famous phrase is the title of book published by Ralph Nader in 1965: Unsafe at
Any Speed, The Designed-In Dangers of the American Automobile, which is largely credited
with inspiring the creation of the auto safety regulatory system in the U.S.
* Rena Steinzor is a professor at the University of Maryland Carey Law School and the
president of the Center for Progressive Reform, www.progressivereform.org. She is the author
of Why Not Jail? Industrial Catastrophes, Corporate Malfeasance, and Government Inaction
published by Cambridge University Press in December 2014. She thanks research librarian
Susan McCarty and research assistant Diana Griffin for their help.
2 Several commentators used this language to describe the behavior of automobile
manufacturers in 2014. See, e.g., Paul A. Eisenstein, After ‘Year of the Recall’ Watchdog Needs
an ‘Enforcer’, NBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2014), http://perma.cc/9SH6-86RW (quoting Mike
Rozembajgier, a vice president at Stericycle, which works with car companies to implement
safety-related service).
3 Christopher Jensen, A Record Year of Recalls: Nearly 64 Million Vehicles, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/business/auto-safety-recalls-set-record-of-
nearly-64-million-vehicles-in-2014.html, http://perma.cc/6342-Q7VE. According to the U.S.
Department of Transportation, 183 million “light duty” vehicles, a category that includes pas-
senger cars and trucks, were on the road in 2012, the last year for which such statistics are
available. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Table 4-11: Light Duty Vehicle, Short Wheel
Base and Motorcycle Fuel Consumption and Travel, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://perma.cc/
4XVB-3B4V.
4 Scott Evans & Angus MacKenzie, The Toyota Recall Crisis: A Chronology of How the
World’s Largest & Most Profitable Automaker Drove into a PR Disaster, MOTOR TREND (Jan.
2010), http://perma.cc/TCQ9-X82E.
5 See Peter Valdes-Dapena & Tal Yellin, GM: Steps to a Recall Nightmare, CNNMONEY
(2015), http://perma.cc/RMG5-QVBN.
6 Pete Bigelow, The Long History Behind Takata’s Massive Airbag Recalls, AUTOBLOG
(June 27, 2014, 4:29 PM), http://perma.cc/FTT5-PXFU.
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Outraged members of Congress hauled top auto executives and govern-
ment officials into oversight hearings where blame was dished out in hearty
portions. Mary Barra, GM’s new chief executive officer (CEO) and the first
woman to head a major U.S. automaker, testified four times,7 doing her best
to appease the audience by pledging to make things right.8 Unfortunately for
GM, Takata, and their customers, however, recalls did not provide an imme-
diate solution because replacement parts were in short supply, delaying re-
pairs by as much as two years.9 Although the media uniformly condemned
all three carmakers, none was higher profile nor more controversial than
GM.  Mary Barra’s contrition before Congress contradicted the company’s
lower-profile behavior in court. GM strongly resisted judicial “park it” or-
ders that would advise consumers to stop using their cars until they were
fixed10 and fought successfully to invoke a liability shield against many con-
sumer damage suits, which it obtained as part of the federal bailout that
released it from bankruptcy proceedings in 2009.11
The company’s split personality did not win it any friends at the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ). As this article goes to press, federal prosecutors have
reportedly discovered “criminal wrongdoing” at the company and “are ne-
gotiating what is expected to be a record penalty.”12 Anonymous sources
briefed on the inquiry said charges could be brought against both the com-
pany and individual employees.13
Beyond the satisfaction they took in scolding some of the most power-
ful business people in the world at oversight hearings, members of Congress
had what appeared to be the even more gratifying experience of excoriating
the civil servants in charge of the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration (NHTSA). The condemnation was bipartisan: Senator Claire McCas-
kill (D-MO) said that NHTSA was “more interested in singing ‘Kumbaya’
7 Melissa Burden & David Shepardson, GM CEO Mary Barra Won’t Attend Awards Event,
DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 12, 2014, http://perma.cc/XXC9-NNV8.
8 Bill Vlasic & Danielle Ivory, Barra Faces Scrutiny in House Over G.M. Recalls, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/19/business/house-hearing-on-gen-
eral-motors-recalls.html, http://perma.cc/PJX3-6LBX.
9 Jerry Hirsch, Many Recalled Vehicles Do Not Get Repaired, Posing a Safety Risk, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2014, http://perma.cc/Z82C-7PAE (reporting on delays in repairs at GM deal-
erships); David Sedgwick, Airbag Inflator Shortage Plagues Industry: With Tight Capacity, 2
Years Needed for Replacements, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014), http://perma.cc/RF66-
2YPH (explaining that Takata Corporation will not be able to produce an adequate number of
replacement airbags to satisfy a Honda recall for two years and that other manufacturers would
have to invent such replacements); Hilary Stout & Rebecca R. Ruiz, Recalled G.M. Cars
Remain Unrepaired, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2014, http://perma.cc/5NTG-A5D4.
10 Katie Lobosco, Judge Won’t Force GM to Issue ‘Park It Now’ Order, CNNMONEY (Apr.
17, 2014), http://perma.cc/AGX5-M6LA.
11 Mike Spector, GM Heads Back into Court, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2015, http://www.wsj
.com/articles/gm-heads-back-into-court-1424128905, http://perma.cc/N378-UQ45.
12 Danielle Ivory, Ben Protess, & Bill Vlasic, G.M. Inquiry Said to Find Criminal Wrong-
doing, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/23/business/gm-inquiry-
said-to-find-criminal-wrongdoing.html, http://perma.cc/FK6R-ZRN2?type=live.
13 Id.
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with the manufacturers than being a cop on the beat.”14 A report written by
staff for Republican members of the House Energy and Commerce Commit-
tee attributed the recall crisis to NHTSA’s “lack [of] focus and rigor.”15
As this article goes to press in the early summer of 2015, mixed
messages prevail. The independent administrator of GM’s victim compensa-
tion fund has acknowledged that 104 people were killed in accidents caused
by faulty ignition switches.16 NHTSA says that as many as 89 people were
killed in Toyota sudden acceleration accidents.17 These numbers will almost
certainly increase as product liability lawsuits are resolved and the GM-initi-
ated compensation fund processes more claims. Despite the worst safety re-
call crisis it has endured in many years, GM was quite profitable in 2014,
allowing CEO Barra to retain her star status in business media.18 NHTSA
has a new administrator who has pledged extensive reforms although he has
yet to receive sufficient additional resources to make many of those changes
feasible.19 A consortium of ten automakers led by Toyota has taken the unu-
sual step of convening to fund an independent engineering firm to develop a
permanent fix to the airbag problem.20 Most noteworthy of all, federal prose-
cutors have launched criminal investigations at GM and Takata.21
As federal prosecutors seem to recognize, criminal prosecutions of indi-
vidual executives are a promising route to real change in an industry that
makes equipment that is as dangerous as it is essential. Although the regula-
tory system was intended to prevent such deadly outcomes, it has failed, and
14 Kevin Robillard, Congress Blasts Auto Safety Regulator, POLITICO (Sept. 17, 2014, 5:04
AM), http://perma.cc/Q73Q-JA7S.
15 STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 113TH CONG., STAFF REPORT ON
THE GM IGNITION SWITCH RECALL: REVIEW OF NHTSA 44 (2009), http://perma.cc/6BL2-
YFQH.
16 David Shepardson, GM Ignition Switch Fund OKs Compensation for 104 Deaths, DE-
TROIT NEWS, (May 18, 2015, 10:23 AM), http://perma.cc/W4BF-KJV7. The number has in-
creased every week for the past several months.
17 Jeff Plungis, Toyota Sudden Acceleration May Be Tied to 89 Deaths, U.S. Says, BLOOM-
BERGBUSINESS (May 25, 2010), http://perma.cc/YSK7-6P4Y.
18 Jaclyn Trop, Is Mary Barra Standing on a “Glass Cliff”?, NEW YORKER, Apr. 29, 2014,
http://perma.cc/67WM-LYM9 (“Her appointment was a surprise—she hadn’t been considered
a front-runner—but a welcome one, for both advocates of gender equality and employees of
G.M., where she is well respected. . . . Barra has been on the job for only three months, and
has been mired in recalls for two of them, but early signs indicate that she is widely regarded
as a strong leader who is adept at navigating difficult circumstances . . . .”); Bill Vlasic, Profit
Doubles at G.M., as It Strives to Move Past Its Litany of Recalls, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2014,
http://perma.cc/3R84-EX8U.
19 Matthew L. Wald, Auto Safety Nominee Wants Finer Data Tools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2014, http://perma.cc/T6ZK-9E3H.
20 Joe White & Paul Lienert, Carmakers Eye Engineering Firm, Ex-Regulator for Takata
Airbag Probe, REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2015, 5:07 PM), http://perma.cc/M2PG-PWDJ (reporting on
the efforts by a consortium of ten automakers, led by Toyota Motor Corp., to hire an indepen-
dent engineering firm and a former NHTSA administrator to investigate the airbag problem).
21 Fred Meier, James R. Healey, & Todd Spangler, Feds Open Criminal Probe of GM
Switch Recall, USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 2014, 7:09 PM), http://perma.cc/X2KR-7ARY; Maki
Shiraki & Mari Saito, Takata Says It is Subject of U.S. Criminal Probe on Air Bags, REUTERS
(Nov. 13, 2014, 10:34 PM), http://perma.cc/3QZC-PL9E.
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will continue to be dysfunctional until Congress gives NHTSA significantly
stronger legal authority and much more money. Congressional action does
not seem likely for the foreseeable future.
Using GM as a case study, I argue here that automakers have grown so
complacent that they view billions of dollars in civil penalties and tort dam-
ages as unfortunate but routine costs of doing business. When the corpora-
tion is targeted as solely responsible for fatal defects, the legal system fails
to instill the wariness in top executives that is essential if senior and mid-
level managers are to make consumer safety their top priority. Too many
companies—and GM is a prime example—have internal cultures of going
along to get along that make safety defects recede into the background.22
To reverse these troubling trends, individual executives with the power
to establish early warning systems and repair defects quickly must perceive a
personal threat if they do not act. Individual prosecutions are possible under
both federal and state criminal law. Federal statutes authorize felony prose-
cutions for offenses such as lying to law enforcement officials that may well
apply to defect cases. State criminal laws have a long tradition of punishing
reckless homicide, also known as willful manslaughter. Rather than allowing
the 2014 recall debacle to float past us without inspiring systemic change
that will save lives, criminal prosecutions should become an integral part
of—even a priority for—both federal and state governments.
This article opens with an explanation of regulatory failure at NHTSA.
It examines the evidence made public about GM’s mishandling of the igni-
tion switch defect. It concludes with some suggestions regarding the crimi-
nal offenses that could be prosecuted.
II. REGULATORY FAILURE
The fatality rate in traffic accident deaths has been falling steadily and
NHTSA can certainly take pride in that outcome.23 Regardless, the agency’s
bewildered, even feckless responses to Toyota’s sudden acceleration
problems, GM’s defective ignition switches, and Takata’s air bag fiasco have
brought the agency back to the forefront of public attention in what can only
be described as disgrace. Instead of marching out ahead of manufacturers to
discover incipient defects, NHTSA typically lags far behind, appearing in-
competent, subject to industry capture, or both.
22 See, e.g., Micheline Maynard, “The GM Nod” & Other Cultural Flaws Exposed by the
Ignition Defect Report, FORBES (June 5, 2014, 1:51 PM), http://perma.cc/WV43-LBJY (“The
report by attorney Anton Valukas, which GM submitted to the government Thursday morning,
is a devastating take down of the inertia and incompetence inside GM over the defects that
have killed 13 people, and possibly more.”).
23 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FATALITY ANALYSIS RECORDING SYSTEM
(FARS) ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://perma.cc/3P36-GV38 (showing a steady decrease in fatality rate
from 1994 to 2012).
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This unfortunate de´nouement did not arise suddenly. To put the conver-
gence of the auto industry’s failure to prevent safety defects and NHTSA’s
acute regulatory dysfunction into some kind of historical perspective, we
need only look at Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst’s seminal 1990 book enti-
tled The Struggle for Auto Safety.24 A quarter century later, the book can only
provoke a strong sense of “de´ja` vu all over again.”25 Mashaw and Harfst’s
dissection of the internal dynamics within the auto industry, their analysis of
NHTSA’s self-inflicted wounds, and their vivid descriptions of the political
crosswinds that buffet the agency from both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue
are as true today as they were a quarter century ago. The industry and the
federal government are in their fifth decade of struggling over auto safety,
and the industry still overwhelms the regulators.
Mashaw and Harfst explain that early in its history, NHTSA largely
relinquished, with little resistance, the option of writing preventive rules.26
Instead, the agency embraced the recall as its primary mode of operation.
They attribute this shift largely to the hubris of NHTSA engineers. The
agency’s first rules attempted to micromanage automotive designs, engender-
ing strong resistance from manufacturers, and NHTSA withdrew in disarray.
Over time, it shifted instead to recalls to ameliorate the effects of safety
defects rather than trying to forestall them through prescriptive rules. This
preference became entrenched by the early 1990s, when Mashaw and Harfst
published their definitive analysis, although even then reformers with fore-
sight might have steered the agency in a different direction. These days, the
deep-seated polarization between conservative and progressive policymakers
regarding the appropriate regulatory role of the federal government makes it
difficult to imagine that congressional leaders could ever agree on how to
overhaul NHTSA legislatively.27
The latest crisis in confidence regarding NHTSA began with its inabil-
ity to cope with Toyota’s sudden acceleration problems and has yet to
culminate.28 As early as 2000, the agency started to receive consumer com-
plaints that various Toyota models were prone to hurtle out of control, reach-
ing speeds as high as 120 miles per hour as frantic drivers tried without
success to turn off the motor or use emergency brakes.29 Toyota insisted that
confused drivers stepped on the gas pedal instead of the brakes, invoking the
24 JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990).
25 Yogi Berra is credited with coining this famous phrase. See YOGI BERRA, WHAT TIME IS
IT? YOU MEAN NOW? 137 (2002).
26 MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 24, at 10–19. The agency still writes rules, but they R
take a long time and are few in number.
27 For an analysis of these tensions, see Rena Steinzor, The Truth About Regulation in
America, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y R. 323 (2011).
28 For an explanation of the immediately preceding crisis, see generally PAUL F. ROTH-
BERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30710, FIRESTONE TIRE RECALL: NHTSA, INDUSTRY AND
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES (2001).
29 SUZANNE M. KIRCHHOFF & DAVID RANDALL PETERMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL-
R41205, UNINTENDED ACCELERATION IN PASSENGER VEHICLES 1 (2010).
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traditional first line of defense to defect allegations: the machine is fine and
all problems are caused by driver error. The company’s critics speculated
that a problem in the cars’ highly sophisticated computer systems was to
blame.30 No modern car can operate without such “drive by wire” systems,
which are complex and prone to errors that are hard to diagnose.31 Toyota
insisted that its software was fine but that poorly placed floor mats could
entrap gas pedals, throwing the car into maximum acceleration mode.32
As the controversy played out, NHTSA was under heavy pressure to
figure out whether a malfunction in affected Toyota models’ computer sys-
tems was a root cause of sudden acceleration. But it did not tackle the tech-
nical issues on its own, instead referring the investigation to scientists at the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Department of
Transportation (DOT) Secretary Ray LaHood admitted that only two of the
agency’s 125 engineers specialize in electronics, confirming the worst suspi-
cions that the agency was incompetent with respect to this central aspect of
automobile design and construction.33 After months of study, NASA experts
said they could not find a problem with Toyota computer systems, vindicat-
ing Toyota’s long-standing claims that driver error, floor mats, and pedals
were the real culprits.34 NASA is now so popular among industry executives
that GM asked a “special team” to review whether 2.6 million recalled cars
with ignition switch problems could be made safer if drivers use only the car
key without a key chain and other keys.35 The implications of having the
most sophisticated automotive experts within the federal government housed
in an agency that is separate from the one assigned to regulate safety in the
industry are painful to contemplate. Allowing those government experts to
sell their skills to a regulated party only exacerbates the damage to NHTSA’s
reputation because it further undermines the core value that the government
must remain objective with respect to such disputes.
In August 2009, California Highway Patrolman Mark Saylor and three
family members died after their Toyota Lexus slammed into another vehicle
30 See, e.g., Ken Bensinger & Ralph Vartabedian, For Toyota, the Crucial Question is the
Electronics, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2010), http://perma.cc/U4EL-DW7Q (“For Toyota, the cru-
cial question is the electronics. The company vigorously denies that its vehicles’ acceleration
problems might stem from an electronic or software glitch. But it remains an open question,
and any such finding would be devastating.”).
31 See, e.g., Ian Austen, Drive by Wire, an Aerospace Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2013,
http://perma.cc/R4K6-VK9A; Lindsay Chappell, By-wire Age is Coming; What’s Missing is
Trust, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Dec. 2, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://perma.cc/7YDV-PUPN.
32 Bill Vlasic, Toyota’s Slow Awakening to a Deadly Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010,
http://perma.cc/9JC6-F9PN [hereinafter Slow Awakening].
33 Jeff Green & Angela Greiling Keane, Recalls Triple as Electronics Run Cars, Swamp
U.S. Regulators, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 25, 2010, 7:22 PM), http://perma.cc/C363-7YXW
(“[NHTSA] lacks regulations for auto electronics, and rules governing accelerators were writ-
ten in 1973 and last updated in 1995.”).
34 Mark Rechtin, Toyota Image Surges on NASA Study, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Feb. 14,
2011, 12:01 AM), http://perma.cc/2D59-KR9T.
35 David Shepardson, GM Seeks NASA Help in Recall Review, DETROIT NEWS (Apr. 9,
2014, 11:27 PM), http://perma.cc/MH2F-HRSL.
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and crashed into a dirt embankment. The crash was accompanied by a blood-
curdling recording of Saylor’s brother-in-law pleading for help on a 911 call
and the screams of the four in their final seconds.36 Frustrated by Toyota’s
continued resistance to a major recall, a delegation of top DOT officials
traveled to Japan to confront Toyota executives. But in the same story that
described the trip, the New York Times reported that “[n]ot once in more
than six years of reviews of Toyota’s problems did officials at [NHTSA],
which regulates automakers, use their power to subpoena Toyota’s records,
even though they said they believed the automaker was withholding crucial
information.”37 The agency’s reputation degenerated further when veteran
auto industry reporter Micheline Maynard disclosed the content of a confi-
dential memo written by Toyota’s lobbying team that bragged about saving
$100 million by, in essence, stalling NHTSA’s informal demands that the
company initiate recalls.38
Finally, after ten years of delay, Toyota agreed in January 2010 to recall
millions of cars.39 NHTSA received little credit for this resolution and in-
stead appeared like a nervous bystander, wringing its hands, sporadically
talking tough, but never in control of the effort to force the haughty and
secretive Toyota to come to grips with the problem.
The U.S. has experienced about 150 recalls involving approximately
fifteen million vehicles annually over the last several years. Yet, according
to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), “NHTSA has estimated that it
opens an average of around one hundred defect investigations each year, and
that about half the investigations it opens result in a safety recall or other
manufacturer action; these represent about one-quarter of all vehicle re-
calls.”40 Even where NHTSA is involved in discussions with a company
about a safety defect, recalls come only after extensive, drawn-out negotia-
tions. The agency seems inordinately comfortable in its role of cajoler-in-
chief. Former administrator David Strickland told Congress in 2010 that
NHTSA strongly prefers to go the voluntary route because litigating a recall
order can cause extensive delays in getting dangerous cars repaired.41 This
36 Vlasic, Slow Awakening, supra note 32 (“The 911 call came at 6:35 p.m. on Aug. 28 R
from a car that was speeding out of control on Highway 125 near San Diego. The caller, a male
voice, was panic-stricken: ‘We’re in a Lexus . . . we’re going north on 125 and our accelerator
is stuck . . . we’re in trouble . . . there’s no brakes . . . we’re approaching the intersection . . .
hold on . . . hold on and pray . . . pray . . . .’ The call ended with the sound of a crash.”).
37 Eric Lichtblau & Bill Vlasic, Safety Agency Scrutinized as Toyota Recall Grows, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2010, http://perma.cc/ZCU6-3L22.
38 Micheline Maynard, Toyota Cited $100 Million Savings After Limiting Recall, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2010, http://perma.cc/EE2M-CMER.
39 Id.
40 BILL CANIS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43454, POLICY ISSUES IN THE GENERAL
MOTORS VEHICLE RECALL 2 (2014).
41 KIRCHHOFF & PETERMAN, supra note 29, at 4. In fairness, Strickland also asked Con- R
gress to strengthen the agency’s legal authority to order recalls, lightening the burden of litigat-
ing such disputes. The Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 2010: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\9-2\HLP209.txt unknown Seq: 8 29-MAY-15 14:47
908 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 9
avowed commitment to collaboration creates the perceptions that NHTSA
negotiators are afraid to go to court and that manufacturers risk little by
stalling recalls.
One reason for NHTSA’s hesitance to litigate is that its funding gaps
are acute. NHTSA is a small agency, with about 590 employees42 and a total
budget of $819 million for FY 2014.43 One additional fact that rarely
emerges in media accounts of its ineffectiveness is that the lion’s share of the
money is devoted to state highway traffic safety grants used to target
problems like drunk driving, leaving only about fifteen to twenty percent
allocated to the agency’s vehicle safety programs. NHTSA’s Office of De-
fects Investigation (ODI)—functionally, the primary unit that carries out the
agency’s auto safety mission—had a staff of fifty-one in 2014.44 Expecting
that small staff to oversee the design, marketing, and performance of the
fifteen million new cars sold annually,45 not to mention emerging defects in
cars already on the road, is patently unreasonable. The White House is now
seeking to triple NHTSA’s defect investigation budget to $31.3 million, up
from $9.7 million in the 2015 fiscal year.46
The prospects for the revitalization of NHTSA are dim. President
Obama is unlikely to achieve steady increases in NHTSA’s budget because
the Republican majority in Congress is so committed to budget cutting and
so vehemently against “job-killing regulation.”47 The agency could also ben-
efit from stronger enforcement tools. For example, civil penalty assessments
for late reporting of defect-related information should not be capped at
thirty-five million dollars.48 The safety standard in the statute, which requires
the agency to prove that a defect presents an “unreasonable risk,” forces it
to engage in a burdensome investigation of whether the value of the human
Cong. 50 (2010) (statement of David Strickland, Administrator, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration).
42 Examining the GM Recall and NHTSA’s Defect Investigation Process: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, & Insurance of the S. Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, & Transportation, 113th Cong. 3 (2014) [hereinafter Friedman Testimony]
(statement of David J. Friedman, Acting Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration).
43 NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET
OVERVIEW 14 (2014).
44 Friedman Testimony, supra note 42, at 4. R
45 Associated Press, Auto Sales Reach Six-Year High of 15.6 Million Vehicles Sold, Ford
F-Series Takes the Lead, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 6, 2014, 1:20 PM), http://www.nydailynews
.com/autos/auto-sales-reach-six-year-high-demand-peaked-article-1.1567645, http://perma.cc/
4TNM-FQNG.
46 David Shepardson, White House Seeks to Nearly Triple NHTSA Defect Budget, DETROIT
NEWS (Feb. 2, 2015, 6:57 PM), http://perma.cc/CRZ4-UXP5.
47 See, e.g., John R. Parkinson, Speaker Boehner: Cut Spending & Job-Killing Regulations
Strangling Employers, ABC NEWS (Feb. 9, 2011, 12:25 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/
politics/2011/02/speaker-boehner-cut-spending-job-killing-regulations-strangling-employers/,
http://perma.cc/U4EG-8HVE; Megan R. Wilson, Incoming Senate Majority Leader: Jobs, Key-
stone, & Regulations Top Agenda, HILL (Jan. 4, 2015, 11:35 AM), http://perma.cc/TMC8-
3YMD.
48 See 49 U.S.C. § 30165 (2012).
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lives at stake exceeds the cost of the fix, a grueling and, at times, bizarre
process.49 The process for ordering recalls is also excessively cumbersome,
requiring the agency to try its case administratively and, if the manufacturer
still resists, to go to court to win a judicial order mandating a recall.50 In the
best of all worlds, Congress would raise the penalties several-fold, change
the safety standard to ease NHTSA’s burden of proof, and streamline the
process by allowing NHTSA to go directly to federal district court to compel
a recall.51 But those improvements would be achievable only if Congress
amends the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, a prospect as unlikely as significant
budget increases for the same political reasons.
Some critics believe that NHTSA’s central problem is regulatory cap-
ture and they undoubtedly have a point.52 The inspector general of the De-
partment of Transportation reported in April 2011 that from 1999 to 2010,
forty officials left NHTSA for industry jobs, including four administrators,
two deputy administrators, seven associate administrators and two chief
counsels.53 During the same period, twenty-three auto industry executives
were appointed to top agency jobs. The steady migration of NHTSA officials
to the far better compensated ranks of the car companies’ technical and pub-
lic relations staff cannot help but blunt NHTSA’s regulatory instincts.
Capture, however extensive, is only part of the story. NHTSA suffers
from a long-running crisis of confidence. Its timidity results from the sad
reality that it cannot afford to hire adequate technical staff and is almost
always out-maneuvered by regulated parties. As the year of the recall dem-
onstrates, NHTSA’s waning strength has occurred at the same time that
automakers appear increasingly unwilling to address the most rudimentary
hazards. The causal connection between the two developments and the ur-
gent need for more effective government intervention is illustrated well by
GM’s failure over more than a decade to correct the ignition switch problems
in the Cobalt, the Ion, and other models. The full details of this odyssey have
not yet emerged, but the information disclosed by GM’s own internal investi-
gation of key events suggests that criminal charges may well be appropriate,
as explained in this article’s final section.
49 See 49 U.S.C. § 30102 (2012).
50 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., SAFETY RECALL COMPENDIUM: A GUIDE
FOR THE REPORTING, NOTIFICATION, & REMEDY OF MOTOR VEHICLE AND MOTOR VEHICLE
EQUIP. IN ACCORDANCE WITH TITLE 49 OF THE U.S. CODE, CHAPTER 301 & SUPPORTING FED.
REGULATIONS (2015), http://perma.cc/XG2Q-F2Q3.
51 See Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 2010, H.R. 5381, 111th Cong. (2010).
52 See, e.g., Dan Becker & James Gerstenzang, Op-Ed, Safety Sacrificed in NHTSA Re-
volving Door, USA TODAY (Feb. 25, 2015, 8:02 AM), http://perma.cc/UQG3-ZTCN (citing an
inspector general report).
53 Letter from Calvin L. Scovel III, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Transp., to John D. Rockefel-
ler IV, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp. & Mark L. Pryor, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, & Ins. (Apr. 4, 2011), http://perma.cc/S9BK-C7QB.
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III. THE GREAT GM BUNGLE
A. The “Unvarnished Truth”
The best source of information about GM’s ignition switch defect avail-
able when this article went to press was a report commissioned by the com-
pany itself and written by Anton Valukas, a former U.S. Attorney and the
current Chairman of the Chicago-based law firm Jenner & Block.54 The
Valukas report is labeled “privileged and confidential” and is chock full of
information and opinions that would ordinarily never see the light of day.
These revelations are so sensitive that it far from clear whether GM intended
from the outset for its results to become public. As a strategy for demonstrat-
ing newly installed CEO Barra’s commitment to coming clean with the pub-
lic and shaking up GM’s dysfunctional internal culture, though, its release
worked like a charm.55
The 315-page report explains that Barra and the GM Board directed
Valukas to embrace two distinctly different goals for the report: finding the
“unvarnished truth about what happened” with the ignition switch and de-
termining who knew what when among “specific senior executives, as well
as GM’s Board.”56 The investigators spent their time on document review
and interviewing GM employees—they had “unlimited access” to both.57
They did not make an effort to “reconstruct accidents or determine which
injuries or fatalities were or were not caused by the safety defect in the
Cobalt and other cars.”58 And they received only partial disclosure of docu-
ments from Delphi Mechatronics, a key player in the drama because it de-
signed and manufactured the switch. With their high-priced billable hours
mounting swiftly, the lawyers spared no effort to be thorough, collecting
forty-one million documents estimated to contain twenty-three terabytes of
data; conducting several levels of document review with the assistance of no
fewer than four “forensic [document management, among other services]
firms”; and interviewing 230 witnesses, some more than once, for a total of
350 interviews, always with “at least” two lawyers present.59
As explained further in the final section of this article, the gist of poten-
tial criminal charges under state law is that GM executives were willfully
54 The firm has 434 lawyers, annual revenues of $357 million, and offices in Chicago,
Dallas, New York, and Washington, D.C. Jenner & Block Law Firm Profile, AMERICAN LAW-
YER, http://perma.cc/ZX44-PRM9.
55 GM CEO Mary Barra’s Remarks to Employees on Valukas Report Findings (June 5,
2014), http://perma.cc/G6G7-84AM (“But as I lead GM through this crisis, I want everyone to
know that I am guided by two clear principles: First, that we do the right thing for those who
were harmed; and, second, that we accept responsibility for our mistakes and commit to doing
everything within our power to prevent this problem from ever happening again.”).
56 ANTON R. VALUKAS, REPORT TO GENERAL DIRECTORS OF GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY
REGARDING IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS 12 (2014).
57 Id. at 14.
58 Id. at 12.
59 Id. at 14.
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blind, or reckless, with respect to the discovery and remediation of the igni-
tion switch defect, and that this behavior had the result that people died who
could have been saved. The gist of federal charges is that they lied, or caused
others in the company to lie, to the government, and also that they failed to
notify NHTSA officials in a timely manner that the ignition switch problem
was a safety defect.
Four clusters of facts are most relevant to these potential charges: (1)
the ways in which GM policy, written and unwritten, contributed to lengthy
delays in fixing the switch and recalling affected vehicles; (2) the fraudulent
and deeply destructive actions of Ray DeGiorgio, the engineer in charge of
the Cobalt’s ignition switch system; (3) the inept performance of GM engi-
neers in response to mounting evidence that ignition switch problems were
killing and injuring people; and (4) the passivity of individual lawyers in
GM’s general counsel’s office regarding repeated warnings by outside coun-
sel about the hazards posed by the defective switches. The following is by no
means an exhaustive analysis of available public information but rather
cherry picks some of the most disturbing scenarios to demonstrate why crim-
inal charges would be appropriate.
B. GM’s Stall Phobia
Ignition switches are designed to have sufficient torque (the force re-
quired to rotate an object) to remain in a “run” position when the driver
turns the key:
Components within the Ignition Switch control the amount of ef-
fort required to turn the switch from one position to another. A
plunger cap and coiled spring inside the Ignition Switch sit in a
small groove called a ‘detent,’ which holds the switch in the posi-
tion to which the driver turns the key: Off, Run, Accessory, or
Crank. The driver rotates the key by applying a certain amount of
torque to overcome the detent, thereby rotating the switch out of
one position and into another.60
Because the Cobalt and Ion switches did not have sufficient torque,
they were prone to slipping the detent and landing in an off or accessory
position when the key was jostled with even light pressure (by, for example,
the driver’s knee touching the key or the weight of a swinging key ring). As
we will see, a GM engineer named Ray DeGiorgio, who was responsible for
switch design in the Cobalt, had sufficient advance notice of this problem
prior to production of the car to have insisted on a re-design. In fact, DeGi-
orgio signed an e-mail to a colleague with the ostensibly wry appellation
60 Id. at 26. For an investigative television report that explains the problem using easily
understood visuals accompanied by interviews with the experts outside GM who discovered it,
see GM Recall: The Switch from Hell (CBC NEWS television broadcast Oct. 31, 2014), http://
perma.cc/ZWU4-XD8F.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\9-2\HLP209.txt unknown Seq: 12 29-MAY-15 14:47
912 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 9
“Ray (tired of the switch from hell) DeGiorgio.”61 But he said nothing as the
new car went into production probably because of internal pressure not to
interfere with its 2004 launch date. Once Cobalts hit the road and reports of
moving stalls began to filter into the team assigned to oversee it, a different
dynamic took over.
In March 2005, Jack Weber, a GM engineer, reported to GM’s Brand
Quality group that, while driving a manual transmission Cobalt, his knee
“contacted the key fob and key ring,” causing a “pulling on the key to move
it to the ‘Off’ position.”62 Steven Oakley, a Brand Quality Manager, opened
a “Field Performance Report” to “address this issue, and the report [was]
assigned the lowest severity level,” a four.63 A severity level four connoted a
problem that is viewed as a mere “annoyance [demanding] continuous im-
provement.”64 Oakley later explained that “severity level 4” was “the de-
fault setting” and that “he did not change it.”65 He added that he thought the
“inadvertent shut-off was a safety issue, but Gary Altman, the PEM [Pro-
gram Engineering Manager] for the Cobalt program team, and other engi-
neers told him it was not, and he deferred to them.”66
By June 2005, despite the company’s obfuscation about the severity of
the stalling problem, the problem was sufficiently well known that Christo-
pher Jensen, auto editor of the Cleveland Plain Dealer, wrote a bitingly sa-
tiric column entitled “Salamis, key rings and GM’s ongoing sense of
humor”:
Just when things look so glum for General Motors, what a relief
that somebody at the world’s largest automaker still has a sense of
humor.
In this case it comes from a GM news release about the possibility
that the engine on its 2005 Chevrolet Cobalt (built by God-fearing
and corn-fed Buckeyes in Lordstown) might inadvertently shut off.
The release was issued in response to a short piece in last Sunday’s
New York Times that accompanied a generally favorable review of
the Cobalt. In the sidebar story, free-lance writer Jeff Sabatini re-
ported that a test Cobalt driven by his wife stalled, apparently after
her knee bumped the steering column.
Intrigued, I asked GM in Detroit if there was an official statement.
Sure enough there was and it is, please excuse me, a knee slapper,
61 Gabe Gutierrez, Rich Gardella & Talesha Reynolds, GM Report: Engineer Approved
‘Switch From Hell’ Even Though It Didn’t Meet Specs, NBC NEWS (June 5, 2014), http://www
.nbcnews.com/storyline/gm-recall/gm-report-engineer-approved-switch-hell-even-though-it-
didnt-n123791, http://perma.cc/U26V-GEKT.
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suggesting that an engine that can be inadvertently turned off is
not a safety problem.
‘In rare cases when a combination of factors is present, a Chevro-
let Cobalt driver can cut power to the engine by inadvertently
bumping the ignition key to the accessory or off position while the
car is running. . . . When this happens, the Cobalt is still controlla-
ble . . . The engine can be restarted after shifting to neutral.’. . .
So, if you’re whisking along at 65 mph or trying to pull across an
intersection and the engine stops, that’s what you do. Only a
gutless ninny would worry about such a problem. Real men are not
afraid of temporary reductions in forward momentum.67
In December 2005, as additional reports of moving stalls continued to
come in, Oakley drafted a Technical Service Bulletin (TSB) entitled “Infor-
mation on Inadvertent Turning of Key Cylinder, Loss of Electrical System
and No DTCs.”68 TSBs inform dealers about problems so that they are able
to respond to consumer complaints. They are the precursor to a full-fledged
recall. But the TSB did not use the word “stall” and gave no hint that they
might be a safety issue. Oakley explained to the Valukas investigators that
the word “stall” was a “hot” word at GM because it suggests a safety prob-
lem that should prompt a recall, as opposed to a mere alert to dealers.69
C. DeGiorgio Goes Under the Bus
The Valukas report apportions most of the blame for GM’s delays in
dealing with the ignition switch problem to Ray DeGiorgio, the engineer
responsible for the development and manufacture of switches used in GM’s
new compact models beginning in the fall of 1999.70 A fair interpretation of
its preoccupation with DeGiorgio is that in the foreseeable event that a fed-
eral or state criminal prosecution is brought, DeGiorgio is a large and ap-
pealing target, not least because he was among fifteen employees fired by
Mary Barra on the same day that GM released the Valukas report.71 Admit-
tedly, his behavior looks very bad. But he was not solely responsible for
GM’s systemic failure to identify moving stalls as a safety defect and prose-
cuting him alone is unlikely to deter similar behavior across the industry.
DeGiorgio began work as a GM Design Release Engineer in 1991 and
spent his career specializing in switches.72 Documents show that DeGiorgio
“finalized” a specification for a Cobalt ignition switch on March 22, 2001,
67 Christopher Jensen, Salamis, Key Rings & GM’s Ongoing Sense of Humor, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, June 26, 2005, at F1.
68 VALUKAS, supra note 56, at 91. R
69 Id. at 92.
70 Id. at 37.
71 Kyle Stock, GM’s Mary Barra Fires 15, Says More Recalls are Coming, BLOOM-
BERGBUSINESS, (June 5, 2014), http://perma.cc/PN56-86W7.
72 VALUKAS, supra note 56, at 37. R
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in effect assuring switch supplier Delphi that no further changes would be
made and it was free to proceed with the construction of a prototype.73 The
DeGiorgio specification included a range of numbers to signify the torque he
expected the switch to possess.74 But the switch made by Delphi had consid-
erably less torque.75 DeGiorgio approved it anyway, rationalizing that the
switch’s “low torque would not affect the car’s performance.”76 Once reports
of moving stalls reached DeGiorgio, he undertook a startlingly audacious
subterfuge. He instructed Delphi to re-design the switch without telling any-
one within GM.77 The new switch was installed in models from 2006 on-
wards and appears to have solved the stalling problem.78 To cover up this
fix—and, presumably, his initial negligence—DeGiorgio did not change the
part number on the re-designed switch.79 The re-design was discovered only
when experts working for a plaintiff in a product liability case dismantled
pre- and post-2006 switches and compared their insides.80 Other engineers,
as well as the Valukas investigators, asked DeGiorgio about changes to
switch design on more than one occasion and he either lied or pretended he
did not remember what had happened.81 Of course, tinkering with the design
of an automotive part without changing the part number may be a standard
practice in the industry. Regardless, given the growing concern within GM
that switch malfunctions were causing stalls and that stalling cars were in-
volved in bad accidents, DeGiorgio’s behavior is deceptive and unethical at
best, criminal at worst.
The Valukas report makes much of how DeGiorgio’s subterfuge de-
railed the company’s efforts to come to grips with the switch problem, claim-
ing that changing the part without changing the number was an “act that
violated GM’s policies and which would throw GM investigators off the
track for years.”82 This statement is an exaggeration. The investigators may
well have been thrown off track, but they were already heading with deter-
mination in the wrong direction by investigating the problem as one of cus-
tomer convenience, not safety.
Nevertheless, DeGiorgio knew about problems with switch torque
before production of the Cobalt, and recklessly disregarded the implications
of the malfunctions that then occurred. He was sufficiently worried about the
reports of accidents following stalls that he made an affirmative decision to
73 Id. at 38.
74 Id. at 39.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 6.
77 Id. at 9–10.
78 See id.
79 Id. at 10 (“DeGiorgio’s deliberate decision not to change the part number prevented
investigators for years from learning what had actually taken place.”).
80 See id. at 188.
81 Id. at 10 (“[W]hen asked in 2009 and in the years that followed whether the ignition
switch had changed, DeGiorgio said that it had not. To this day, in informal interviews and
under oath, DeGiorgio claims not to remember authorizing the change to the ignition switch or
his decision, at the same time, not to change the switch’s part number.”).
82 Id. at 143.
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change the switch and, it seems, did not tell anyone within the company
about it. He then lied repeatedly when questioned about what had happened.
His lies contributed to GM’s ongoing failure to alert the government to the
defect. Absent mitigating facts that have yet to emerge, these acts and omis-
sions should trigger multiple felony counts.
D. The Engineers
DeGiorgio was the primary engineer assigned to the ignition switch
system on the Cobalt and other models. As accident reports increased, how-
ever, GM managers assigned several other engineers to the issues.83 The
lengthy, descriptive timeline of GM engineers’ fumbling efforts to come to
grips with the switch defect reveals a management structure so devoid of
individual accountability that it goes a long way toward explaining why the
giant automaker required a taxpayer bailout in 2009.84 Indeed, Steven
Rattner, a Wall Street banker who headed President Barack Obama’s team in
charge of the bailout, called the report a “journey down memory lane” that
confirmed his personal experience with GM “culture”:
[L]ooking under the hood of G.M. was the most stunningly disap-
pointing dissection of a paid-up member of corporate America in
my 30-year Wall Street career. Having such a dysfunctional cul-
ture had direct and disastrous consequences for the quality of deci-
sion-making . . . Emblematic of the company’s lack of
management accountability was the insistence of its chief execu-
tive officer, G. Richard Wagoner Jr., that its problems were all the
fault of external forces: its unions, oil prices, the credit crisis and
competition from Japanese imports.85
According to the Valukas investigators:
The Cobalt Ignition Switch issue passed through an astonishing
number of committees. We repeatedly heard from witnesses that
they flagged the issue, proposed a solution, and the solution died
in a committee or with some other ad hoc group exploring the
issue. But determining the identity of any actual decision-maker
was impenetrable. No single person owned any decision. Indeed, it
was often difficult to determine who sat on the committees or what
they considered, as there are rarely minutes of meetings.86
83 Id. at 77.
84 Bill Vlasic & Annie Lowrey, U.S. Ends Bailout of G.M., Selling Last Shares of Stock,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com//2013/12/09/u-s-sells-remaining-stake-
in-gm/, http://perma.cc/T3YE-K4BU.
85 Steven Rattner, Op-Ed., G.M.’s Flawed Culture, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2014, 4:37 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/opinion/steven-rattner-gms-flawed-culture.html, http://
perma.cc/499K-GZJG.
86 VALUKAS, supra note 56, at 255. R
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CEO Mary Barra told the Valukas investigators that this behavior,
which she calls the “GM nod,” was characterized by rambling, open-ended
discussion toward an indefinite conclusion with no assignments for any par-
ticular individual arising from the muddle.87 Such behavior was an open joke
among employees. The New York Times reported on a February 2009 e-mail
sent by engineer Joseph R. Manson to four colleagues: “The [ignition
switch] issue has been around since man first lumbered out of sea and stood
on two feet. In fact, I think Darwin wrote the first P.R.T.S. [Problem Reso-
lution and Tracking System] on this end included as an attachment as part of
his Theory of Evolution.”88
These committees included teams of engineers, and the Valukas investi-
gators were disgusted by their collective failure to make any connection be-
tween the shift of the key to an accessory position and the disabling of the
airbag. The engineers assigned to investigate growing reports of fatal acci-
dents were “neither diligent nor incisive” because they failed to discover the
link that was readily apparent in GM’s internal files and in publicly available
documents written by outside experts.89
Two especially important pieces of outside evidence found this vital
connection in 2007: (1) a written analysis prepared by Keith Young, a Wis-
consin state trooper who reconstructed a fatal accident in his jurisdiction and
(2) a report by Indiana University’s Transportation Research Center.90 Both
documents were in the files of some GM employees but the various commit-
tees appointed to natter about the switch issue somehow overlooked them. In
sum: “The engineers made a basic mistake. They did not know how their
own vehicle had been designed. And GM did not have a process in place to
make sure someone looking at the issue had a complete understanding of
what the failure of the Ignition Switch meant for a customer.”91
87 See id. at 256.
88 Matthew L. Wald & Bill Vlasic, Parts Supplier Delphi is Scrutinized in G.M. Recall,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2014, http://perma.cc/Y2LR-CYYP. A case study by the American Soci-
ety for Quality issued in 2012 explains that the PRTS is “an accessible and readily available
system,” which is “used organization-wide to document all issues during a vehicle’s life-cy-
cle.” MEGAN SCHMIDT, ASQ CASE STUDY: GENERAL MOTORS TECHNICAL PROBLEM-SOLVING
GROUP DRIVES EXCELLENCE 3 (Nov. 2012), http://perma.cc/R368-NYBW. The focus of the
case study was the company’s so-called “Red X Team,” an elite group of problem solvers who
are supposed to take charge of its most troubling performance issues. Before GM’s 2008 bank-
ruptcy, 150 Red X team members dealt with defects but after the company reorganized, only
32 remained. The newsletter article insisted that “[i]nstead of allowing less manpower to
become a roadblock, the team became determined to increase its output of completed projects
and strengthen its role in making every GM vehicle better than the last one.” Id. at 1. The case
study pictures the Red X Masters posed by a new car in red baseball caps, red shirts, and
khakis. It turns out that a Red X Team led by “Dan Davis, GM Red X Global Lead” undertook
an investigation of the ignition switch problem, although, like so many other internal groups
both formal and informal, it ended its investigation without finding a resolution to the problem
and without uncovering DeGiorgio’s 2005 redesign of the switch. VALUKAS, supra note 56, at R
187–88.
89 VALUKAS, supra note 56, at 3. R
90 Id. at 115.
91 Id. at 95.
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Managers were sufficiently aware of the destructive implications of the
GM nod culture that they had engrafted an informal antidote onto its convo-
luted system for monitoring potential defects: the unofficial appointment of
so-called “champions” who were sufficiently senior to push a problem
through the layers of bureaucracy to a permanent solution.92 The ignition
switch safety defect had no fewer than three of these, appointed in sequence
starting in mid-2012.93 The first was Terry Woychowski, Vice President of
Global Quality and Vehicle Launch and a member of the company-wide
committee in charge of recalls, known (as usual, euphemistically) as the Ex-
ecutive Field Action Decision Committee.94 Woychowski retired in the
spring of 2012 for reasons that are unknown, and was replaced by Jim Fede-
rico, director of Global Vehicle Integration, a title that meant he was the
company’s Chief Engineer.95 Federico told the Valukas investigators that he
did not remember being called a “champion” and instead thought that he
was supposed to energize the engineering group to find a solution to the
Cobalt airbag deployment problem.96 When Federico was pulled away by
other responsibilities, Gay Kent, the General Director of GM North America
Vehicle Safety and Crashworthiness, was asked to take his place as cham-
pion, the third change in that designation in ten months. More meetings en-
sued.97 But the catalyst that forced GM to get to the bottom of the problem
did not arise as the result of any of its time-consuming and extraordinarily
ineffective internal activity. Instead, what at last launched GM into effective
action was a deposition of Ray DeGiorgio taken by attorneys in a products
liability case brought by the parents of Brooke Melton,98 who died on her
29th birthday when her 2005 Cobalt stalled and drifted into the path of a
much larger vehicle.99
It may seem like a stretch to suggest that senior executives who are
ineffectual should ever be charged with a crime. But the three champions
should, at the very least, be considered key targets in any such investigation.
How much they knew about why other executives thought the problem de-
manded the appointment of a champion and the reasons why they failed to
respond to the urgent request that they serve as one could indicate the kind
of willful blindness that can demonstrate mens rea in a criminal case.
92 See id. at 253.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 171.
95 Id. at 178.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 208.
98 Bill Vlasic, G.M. Settles Switch Suit, Avoiding Depositions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2015,
http://perma.cc/N5KQ-5JRH. The story characterizes the settlement as a “victory” for GM
because it may allow the company’s senior executives, including Barra, to avoid having their
depositions taken. See id. However, this judgment may be premature because other cases are
pending.
99 Gregory Wallace, Poppy Harlow, & Amanda Hobor, How Brooke Melton’s Death Led
to the GM Recall, CNNMONEY (June 4, 2014), http://perma.cc/739R-CKN6.
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E. The Lawyers
As early as 2011, GM’s general counsel’s office had received considera-
ble information indicating serious problems with non-deploying airbags
from the outside lawyers they had hired to defend product defect cases.100 In
July of that year, a group of lawyers familiar with the problem “called a
meeting to make sure that senior engineering management had ‘eyeballs’ on
the issue” and “[would] not let it flow through the normal process.”101 The
matter was then referred to GM’s Product Investigation unit, which had the
responsibility of “investigating potential safety issues.”102 As time went on,
the in-house lawyers continued to receive increasingly urgent and agitated
reports from outside counsel.103
Then, in May 2013, the DeGiorgio deposition taken in the Melton case
provoked a crisis when the plaintiff’s attorney dropped the “bombshell” that
the switch had been re-designed between 2005 and 2008.104 Two months
later, outside counsel from King & Spalding, who had defended the deposi-
tion, sent a “case evaluation” to GM regarding an undisclosed product lia-
bility case most likely to be Melton’s.105 “This case needs to be settled,” the
outside lawyers stated bluntly, because “there is little doubt that a jury here
will find that the ignition switch used on [the 2005 Cobalt involved in the
plaintiff’s case] was defective and unreasonably dangerous, and that it did
not meet GM’s own torque specifications.”106 The lawyers added that GM’s
own internal documents allowed plaintiff’s counsel “to develop a record
from which he can compellingly argue that GM has known about this safety
defect from the time the first 2005 Cobalt rolled off the assembly line and
has essentially done nothing to correct the problem for the last nine
years.”107 Plaintiff’s counsel will argue that this record is “proof positive of
GM’s conscience [sic] indifferent and willful misconduct when it comes to
the safety of its vehicles’ occupants.”108
Still, the company would not begin serious recalls for another nine
months. Five of the fifteen people fired by Barra in June 2014 were lawyers
in the general counsel’s office.109 According to press reports, they were dis-
missed because they helped to hide the defect for two years before recalls
100 VALUKAS, supra note 56, at 10. R
101 Id. at 211.
102 Id. at 10.
103 Id. at 203–13.
104 Id. at 199.
105 Names of individual plaintiffs were redacted from the Valukas report to protect their
privacy.
106 VALUKAS, supra note 56, at 205. R
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Bill Vlasic, In Surprise, Top Lawyer at G.M. Sets Retirement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/18/business/michael-millikin-gms-top-lawyer-is-retir-
ing.html, http://perma.cc/7LNU-8JG2.
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started.110 One key player was William Kemp, a senior lawyer who had been
orchestrating GM’s legal strategy during that period and who was deeply
involved in the selection of at least two of the “champions” who failed so
miserably to provoke action.111 Kemp was forced to quit when the ignition
switch defect was unmasked in the media. Valukas found that he did not
inform his boss, general counsel Michael Millikin, about the problem until
February 2014.112 Barra also defended Millikin during congressional hear-
ings.113 Nevertheless, Millikin ended up taking a “voluntary” retirement in
October 2014.114
The lawyers who were involved in GM’s internal procrastination re-
garding the switch obviously had the expertise to understand the full ramifi-
cations of the ignition switch defect for consumer safety. As GM employees,
they stand in the first line of culpable parties who participated actively in a
process that delayed mandated NHTSA notifications, stalled recalls, and
may well have cost lives. If pursued by prosecutors, they will undoubtedly
respond that they were required under legal rules of professional conduct to
preserve their clients’ confidentiality.115 If accepted, this view of their con-
duct converts it from a potential crime to the benign activity of serving as
counselors standing on the sidelines, without any responsibility to stop ille-
gal conduct that endangers lives.
IV. CRIMINAL PROSPECTS
A. The Department of Justice Moves Out
In what has the makings of a trend, or at least a boomlet, U.S. Attor-
neys in five states have obtained indictments against individual corporate
executives in six cases where corporate malfeasance killed and injured
workers, consumers, or the environment.116 The cases involve drinking water
110 Bill Vlasic, G.M. Lawyers Hid Fatal Flaw, From Critics & One Another, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 2014, http://perma.cc/8FRY-X6VP.
111 VALUKAS, supra note 56, at 212. R
112 Alison Frankel, Op-Ed., How GM’s Legal Department Failed the Company and its
Customers, REUTERS (June 5, 2014), http://perma.cc/RG2L-U6QA.
113 Vlasic, supra note 109. R
114 Id.
115 The professional rules of conduct in most states give attorneys the option of disclosing
that a client is about to commit a crime or other illegal act to the extent the lawyer believes it is
“reasonably necessary” in order to prevent the “substantial” injury. See, e.g., MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2013), http://perma.cc/TF7D-DP4U (Confidentiality of
Information).
116 In reverse chronological order, the cases involve indictments of individual corporate
executives and managers whom the DOJ alleges are culpable for (1) the chemical spill from a
Freedom Industries tank farm that jeopardized the drinking water supplies in Charleston, West
Virginia, Michael Wines, Owners of Chemical Firm Charged in Elk River Spill in West Vir-
ginia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/us/owners-of-chemi-
cal-company-charged-in-elk-river-spill.html, http://perma.cc/NE4V-4LHH; (2) the shipment of
more than 17,000 vials of meningitis-tainted steroid injections by the New England Com-
pounding Pharmacy, Massachusetts that ultimately killed sixty-four patients, Kay Lazar &
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contaminated by a rusted chemical tank leak in West Virginia; tainted steroid
injections shipped nationwide by a small compounding pharmacy in Massa-
chusetts; a massive explosion in an underground mine owned and operated
by now-defunct Massey Energy, again in West Virginia; cantaloupe infected
with bacteria at a farm in Colorado; peanut paste laced with salmonella and
shipped from Georgia despite positive tests for the bacteria; and the infa-
mous Macondo well blowout that destroyed the Deepwater Horizon oil rig
and spilled 205 million gallons of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico. Alto-
gether, 136 people were killed in these incidents, and hundreds were sick-
ened or injured.
Although the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not maintain a database
that keeps tallies of such prosecutions, the cases are unusual, if not unprece-
dented, for four reasons. They target individuals at the high end of the corpo-
rate chain of command. They involve the criminal provisions of statutes that
are rarely invoked, including ones that categorize crimes as misdemeanors.
They have occurred in such close chronological proximity to each other that
they have attracted more attention, especially in the regulated community,117
than they would if spaced further apart. Most importantly, they have led to
the consideration of criminal prosecutions in the automobile safety defect
cases considered here.
Of course, all of the cases could be rationalized on the basis that the
Obama Administration’s DOJ is more aggressive about targeting white collar
crime than its predecessors because the President is so liberal. That interpre-
tation is undercut by the Administration’s notable and frequently criticized
reluctance to prosecute banking executives in the aftermath of the 2008 mar-
ket crash.118 Instead, the incidents themselves seem to have motivated U.S.
Attorneys embedded in affected communities to try and bring individual ex-
Todd Wallack, 14 Executives, Staff Charged in Tainted Drug Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 17,
2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/12/17/feds-arrest-tied-necc-closed-pharmacy-
blamed-causing-deaths-with-tainted-drugs/24QytISVdaqXDNsSUOsNYJ/story.html, http://per
ma.cc/UR44-UMKZ; (3) a massive explosion at Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch mine in
Montcoal, West Virginia, that killed twenty-nine, Ken Ward Jr., Longtime Massey Energy CEO
Don Blankenship Indicted, SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL, Nov. 13, 2014, http://perma.cc/CJ4N-
H47L; (4) the sale of listeria-contaminated cantaloupes by the Jensen Bros. farm that caused
thirty-three fatalities, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Eric & Ryan Jensen Charged with Introducing
Tainted Cantaloupe into Interstate Commerce (Sept. 26, 2013), http://perma.cc/798E-EL8D;
(5) the shipment of peanut paste contaminated with salmonella from the Peanut Corporate of
America plant in Blakely, Georgia that caused nine deaths, Dan Flynn, Parnell Brothers Taken
into Custody After Convictions, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Sept. 20, 2014), http://perma.cc/LH4Q-
UVJ6; and (6) the Deepwater Horizon oil rig blowout in the Gulf of Mexico that killed eleven
people, Clifford Krauss, In BP Indictments, U.S. Shifts to Hold Individuals Accountable, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2012, http://perma.cc/RRV9-N3N6.
117 See, e.g., Dan Elliott, Associated Press, FDA: Criminal Case Shows Food Safety is
Paramount, USA TODAY (Sept. 27, 2013, 4:52 PM), http://perma.cc/J2Z5-48CE; Dan Flynn,
Reprieve from Criminal Prosecutions May Be Ending for Food Execs, FOOD SAFETY NEWS
(May 4, 2012), http://perma.cc/5EWU-UAVH.
118 See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, The Untouchables: How the Obama Administration Pro-
tected Wall Street from Prosecutions, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2013, 7:27 PM), http://perma.cc/
4AT6-8EFC; Moyers & Company:  Too Big to Jail? (Oct. 3, 2014), http://perma.cc/P9DA-
T78S.
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ecutives to justice. Only time will tell whether future administrations will
continue such prosecutions. Given the growing inability of regulatory agen-
cies to prevent such fatal and destructive incidents, very tempting targets are
likely to present themselves.119
Taking these cases as precursors if not precedents, what might be the
contours of a federal case against GM executives?
The first and most obvious charge is the failure to report a defect under
the Motor Vehicle Safety Act.120 The statute requires a manufacturer to re-
port when it “learns the vehicle or equipment contains a defect and decides
in good faith that the defect is related to motor vehicle safety.”121 Given
NHTSA’s great difficulty in discovering defects independently despite the
time and energy it spends reviewing and investigating consumer complaints,
manufacturer notifications become absolutely critical to the maintenance of
any semblance of government intervention on behalf of consumers to pre-
vent accidents caused by safety defects.
NHTSA has already settled a civil case with GM for thirty-five million
dollars—the most the Act allows it to collect—for failing to file timely noti-
fication.122 The consent order puts GM on a very short leash, with signifi-
cantly expanded requirements to report defects, change its internal defect
identification procedures, and attend frequent meetings with regulators. But
the penalty itself must be viewed as a pittance compared to the estimated
three billion dollars GM spent in the first half of 2014 on defect-related
recalls.123 The economic dynamics of the situation suggest that penalties for
failure to notify assessed against the corporation in such small amounts do
not serve any deterrent purpose. Because carmakers know that acknowledg-
ing a defect means they must undertake both the research necessary to find a
fix and the effort to mount a recall, their clear incentive from an economic
perspective is not to go looking for trouble or, as the ignition switch debacle
suggests, to avoid coming to grips with a problem for as long as possible.
The downside risks of expensive product liability lawsuits and serious
reputational damage must of course occur to senior managers. But the incen-
tives created by civil penalties under the statute seem both ineffective and
counterintuitive.
On the other hand, the statute authorizes felony charges, including
prison time up to fifteen years, against any “person” (including a corpora-
tion) who fails to report “with the specific intention of misleading
119 I develop these arguments at greater length, in other contexts, in RENA STEINZOR, WHY
NOT JAIL? INDUSTRIAL CATASTROPHES, CORPORATE MALFEASANCE, AND GOVERNMENT INAC-
TION (2014).
120 49 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012).
121 Id. § 30118(c)(1) (emphasis added).
122 Matthew Deluca, GM to Pay Feds $35 Million Fine Over Deadly Ignition Fails, NBC
NEWS (May 16, 2014, 9:22 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/gm-recall/gm-pay-feds-
record-35-million-fine-over-deadly-ignition-n107106, http://perma.cc/6GZU-DX28; see also
49 U.S.C. § 30118(c)(1) (2012) (providing legal authority for the consent order).
123 Bill Vlasic, Profit Doubles at G.M., as It Strives to Move Past Its Litany of Recalls,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2014, http://perma.cc/6ETC-NB3V.
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[NHTSA] with respect to motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment safety
related defects that have caused death or serious bodily injury to an individ-
ual.”124 Ray DeGiorgio would appear to be a candidate for this kind of
charge. The question of whether any of the other people who were involved
in investigating the ignition switch problem for so many years harbored a
specific intent to mislead is a more difficult judgment. However, the crimi-
nal law typically evaluates intent on the basis of what a “reasonable person”
would do in such circumstances.125 The Valukas report’s extensive narrative
on the seemingly endless and certainly pointless internal churning over the
ignition switch problem, which was carried out through self-justifying elec-
tronic mail and unproductive meetings, provides an unusual roadmap for
prosecutors intent on demonstrating such intent.
Unfortunately, the Motor Vehicle Safety Act does not establish criminal
culpability for actions that result in harm to motorists beyond the failure to
notify regarding a defect.
B. Obstruction of Justice
Federal and state laws protect the integrity of the criminal justice sys-
tem by imposing criminal penalties for lying to the government, destroying
evidence, or interfering with witnesses or juries. Obstruction provisions are
spread throughout the federal code, but the most prominent generic version
is section 1001 of Title 18, which provides for imprisonment for up to five
years for any person who (1) “falsifies, conceals or covers up . . . a material
fact”; (2) “makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation”; or (3) “makes or uses any false writing or document”.126
Verbal statements count as much as written ones and the bar for what is a
material falsehood is set relatively low: if a statement has the capacity to
influence what the government does in response to it, whether or not it actu-
ally has an effect, it is deemed material.127 GM’s lawyers would appear to be
especially vulnerable to such charges, especially for acts or omissions that
occurred during the period when the lawyers knew the alarming details re-
garding fatal accidents but continued to countenance both their clients’ fail-
ure to notify NHTSA and their misleading assurances to the agency that GM
was dealing appropriately with faulty ignition switches.
C. Reckless Homicide under State Law
State laws make it a crime to cause a death by “consciously disre-
gard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk.”128 Generally, defendants must
124 49 U.S.C. § 30170(a) (2012).
125 See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, §§ 10.02–.04 (6th
ed. 2012) (discussing the reasonable person standard in criminal law).
126 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).
127 See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995).
128 See Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 470 (1992).
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be aware of the risk and act in a way that is unjustifiable. A classic hypothet-
ical posits a pedestrian who steps into an intersection and is killed when a
driver runs her down.129 If it was a dry and sunny day, the light was red, the
walk sign was on, and the driver was speeding in an effort to meet friends
for breakfast, prosecutors will consider charging the crime of reckless man-
slaughter. If, on the other hand, the pedestrian darts into traffic when the
light is green, the walk sign red, the weather is bad, and the driver is travel-
ing within the speed limit to deliver his pregnant wife to the hospital, no
charges will be brought.
The first criminal prosecution of a major U.S. corporation for a safety
defect involved the notorious Pinto, a compact car that had its gas tank posi-
tioned in the rear. Because the tank was not protected by any barrier, Pintos
exploded into flame when hit from the back by a vehicle traveling even at a
relatively low speed, killing everyone inside the car. In 1980, Michael
Cosentino, a county prosecutor in Elkhart, Indiana, charged that the Ford
Motor Company acted recklessly when it ignored the implications of this
design and growing press reports about fatal car crashes like the one that
killed three young women in his jurisdiction.130 The case was a fiasco for the
prosecutor, who was outgunned by Ford and hobbled by adverse legal rul-
ings, although it is still studied in business schools as an example of the
potentially dire outcomes caused by corrupt corporate ethics.131 Perhaps be-
cause Cosentino lost, and certainly because state and local prosecutors are
inundated with street crime cases, white collar prosecutions in health, safety,
and environmental cases remain largely the province of the federal
government.
Once again, based on the Valukas report, a case possibly could be con-
structed that at some definable point in time, individual GM executives had
sufficient knowledge to understand the imminent threat posed by driving a
Cobalt.
D. The Corporation’s Crimes
The Supreme Court first decided in 1909 that corporations could be
convicted of crimes committed by their human agents because to immunize
129 Id. at 482.
130 State v. Ford Motor Co., Case No. 11-431 (Ind. 1980).
131 For an explanation of these adverse rulings as well as the prosecutor’s theory of the
case, see LEE PATRICK STROBEL, RECKLESS HOMICIDE: FORD’S PINTO TRIAL 58 (1980)
(“[Judge] Jones ruled that the indictment was constitutional only when read to charge that
Ford acted recklessly by failing to repair or warn about the Pinto during the 41-day time period
before the [crash at issue]. The elements of the indictment concerning the car’s defective and
dangerous design were relevant only to establish the reason why Ford should have warned the
public or fixed the car during that 41-day period.”). For an example of the reading assigned in
business courses, see Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of
Missed Opportunities, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 379 (1992). For more information about the case in
general, see FRANCIS T. CULLEN ET AL., CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK: THE FORD PINTO
CASE AND BEYOND (1987); Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1013 (1991).
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them would deprive the government of one of its most potent tools for
preventing illegal behavior.132 Despite considerable discourse in the schol-
arly literature about the logic and equity of corporate culpability,133 criminal
charges against corporate entities are common. Corporations cannot go to
jail. Consequently, the most tangible outcome of such cases—other than the
public condemnation they inspire—is a monetary fine. For example, BP paid
$4.5 billion to settle criminal charges arising from the Deepwater Horizon
disaster.134
Over the last several years, though, the DOJ has developed a legal in-
strument called a “deferred prosecution agreement” (or DPA). Such agree-
ments allow corporations to avoid pleading guilty to crimes and instead
subject them to penalties, often in very large amounts, for the privilege until
and unless they behave criminally again. In the six years since President
Obama has been in office, the number of DPAs has gone up substantially.135
The ostensible rationale for such agreements is that forcing corpora-
tions to plead guilty to crimes could put them out of business, a supposition
that is almost entirely based on the story of Arthur Andersen, the giant ac-
counting firm that went out of business in the wake of Enron’s demise be-
cause it was that company’s accountant. Clients left the firm in droves as
soon as the travails of the convoluted pyramid scheme that was Enron hit the
media in October 2001.136 In a frantic effort to avoid further trouble with the
government, Andersen employees in the Houston office started shredding
documents, destroying tons of paper until the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission finally sent it a subpoena a month later. Arthur Andersen was in-
dicted the following spring, fought the case but was convicted at trial, and
the conviction was upheld by the Fifth Circuit.137 One year later, after the
company was all but gone, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction on
relatively technical grounds.138 No one familiar with these events could think
that the indictment was the only reason the company was pushed out of
business. But the saga has taken on the accoutrements of an urban legend,
with commentators invoking Arthur Andersen’s name when they report on
the latest DPA announced by the DOJ.139
132 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909).
133 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319
(1996).
134 Clifford Krauss & John Schwartz, BP Will Plead Guilty and Pay Over $4 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2012, http://perma.cc/S4QG-TC3L.
135 For a discussion of these trends, see generally BRANDON GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL:
HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014).
136 For an excellent discussion of what happened in the case, see generally Kathleen F.
Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 917 (2003).
137 United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 2004).
138 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698, 704–08 (2005).
139 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28,
2006, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116468395737834160, http://perma.cc/3ENC-JHKD.
But see Ted Kaufman, Why DOJ Deemed Bank Execs Too Big to Jail, FORBES (July 29, 2013,
9:30 AM), http://perma.cc/M634-ZFUR.
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In December 2012, the DOJ entered into a $1.9 billion DPA with
HSBC, the world’s third-largest publicly held bank. HSBC stood accused of
laundering money for violent international drug cartels in Mexico and Co-
lombia and conducting banking business in violation of U.S. sanctions for
clients in Burma, Cuba, Iran, Libya, and Sudan. When Attorney General
Eric Holder appeared at a congressional hearing on other matters, senators
took the opportunity to express their astonishment that HSBC had qualified
for such lenient treatment, prompting the New York Times to editorialize:
It is a dark day for the rule of law. Federal and state authorities
have chosen not to indict HSBC, the London-based bank, on
charges of vast and prolonged money laundering, for fear that
criminal prosecution would topple the bank and, in the process,
endanger the financial system. They also have not charged any top
HSBC banker in the case, though it boggles the mind that a bank
could launder money as HSBC did without anyone in a position of
authority making culpable decisions. Clearly, the government has
bought into the notion that too big to fail is too big to jail.140
Despite this criticism, the DOJ signed a DPA with Toyota covering its
sudden unintended acceleration defects in March 2014, with Toyota agreeing
to pay $1.2 billion in civil penalties.141 Toyota’s settlement stipulates that if
Toyota acknowledges the criminal “information” filed by the government in
court, which contains a single charge of wire fraud, and the company
behaves itself for three years, the DOJ will dismiss the charge without
prosecution.142
To be sure, this amount was unprecedented and several orders of mag-
nitude larger than penalties collected by NHTSA for failure to make timely
notification of safety defects. Yet this outcome was far better than the fate
Toyota employees feared they might face. According to the Statement of
Facts posted on the Internet by the DOJ, in a discussion to evaluate a meet-
ing with NHTSA officials in 2010, “one Toyota employee was said to ex-
claim, ‘Idiots! Someone will go to jail if lies are repeatedly told. I can’t
support this.’” 143 The remainder of the statement of facts spells out in dis-
heartening detail Toyota’s systematic effort to stall and deceive NHTSA.
Criminal charges have never been brought—or, as far as we know, even
considered—against individual Toyota executives.
Perhaps the most important criticism of deferred prosecution agree-
ments is that they establish an extraordinarily corrosive double standard be-
tween the well-paid executives employed by multi-billion-dollar, multi-
140 Editorial, Too Big to Indict, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2012, http://perma.cc/K7QA-4FZ3.
141 Bill Vlasic & Matt Apuzzo, Toyota Is Fined $1.2 Billion for Concealing Safety Defects,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2014, http://perma.cc/U4KH-745N.
142 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1, 3–4, United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., No.
1:14-cr-00186 (S.D.N.Y. March 19, 2014), http://perma.cc/EV35-JUSN.
143 Statement of Facts: United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 1
(Mar. 19, 2014), http://perma.cc/AHA9-6UEW.
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national corporations and their individual consumers. A development that
illustrates this double standard in the most troubling way is the criminal
conviction of Koua Fong Lee, who drove his Toyota Camry into the rear of
another car, killing three people.144 Lee was charged with criminal vehicular
homicide and sentenced to eight years in prison. He had served two and a
half years when his claim that the car had suddenly hurtled out of control
and that he was unable to brake it to a stop was substantiated by Toyota’s
recall for a sudden unintended acceleration defect; Lee was then released
from prison.
The GM ignition switch scandal produced a second victimized driver.
Candice Anderson was twenty-one when she lost control of her Cobalt in a
moving stall caused by a defective ignition switch; the car ran into a tree and
her fiance´ was killed and Anderson severely injured.145 Two years later, in
2006, Texas police charged her with reckless homicide. Her parents liqui-
dated their retirement account to pay for her defense. She pled guilty, spent
five years on probation, paid $10,000 in fines, and had to live with the
shame of the crime on top of the grief of the accident. Five months before
she entered her guilty plea, GM had investigated the accident and deter-
mined the defect was the cause, but never informed Anderson or local law
enforcement. In November 2014, after GM finally acknowledged the de-
fect’s role in the fatal accident, a judge cleared her of responsibility for Er-
ickson’s death. “It’s overwhelming; it’s a range of emotions,” Anderson told
the New York Times. “I’m elated. Things are upside down. Or, really, right-
side up.”
E. Punishment, Deterrence, and Moral Boundaries
Black letter legal theory holds that the two primary goals of the crimi-
nal law are to punish and to deter, although renowned legal historian Law-
rence M. Friedman reminds us of a crucial third:
[C]riminal justice tells us where the moral boundaries are; where
the line lies between good and bad. It patrols those boundary lines,
day and night, rain or shine. It shows the rules directly, dramati-
cally, visually, through asserting and enforcing them. (There are
lessons from nonenforcement, too: from situations where the
boundaries are indistinct, or the patrol corrupt or asleep; and soci-
ety is quick to learn these lessons, too.) . . . .
144 Emily Gurnon, St. Paul Man Wrongly Imprisoned in Camry Deaths to be Paid by
State, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Dec. 2, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://perma.cc/VY84-W43P.
145 Rebecca R. Ruiz, Woman Cleared in Death Tied to G.M.’s Faulty Ignition Switch, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2014, http://perma.cc/EB3D-XFSM.
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[T]he history of criminal justice is not only the history of the
forms of rewards and punishment; it is also a story about the domi-
nant morality, and hence a history of power.146
Viewed from this perspective, the contemporary American criminal jus-
tice system is nothing less than an embarrassment to the values that the na-
tion holds dear. Not only does America imprison more people per capita
than any other country in the world, the racial disparities in the system are
appalling. The nation accounts for five percent of the world’s population but
incarcerates twenty-five percent of those jailed; its 5,000 prisons hold about
2.2 million inmates and another 4.7 million people live under the supervision
of correctional institutions.147 African Americans are incarcerated at six
times the rate of whites; Hispanics and African Americans compose about
one quarter of the nation’s population but constituted fifty-eight percent of
the prison population in 2008.148
In his book The Divide, American Injustice in the Age of the Wealth
Gap, Matt Taibbi asks why, in a period when crime has been going down
across the country, including in its largest cities, the population in prison has
doubled since 1990. He also wonders why, in the wake of the worst eco-
nomic crash since the Great Depression, none of the prominent financiers
who played fast and loose with fraudulent instruments like credit swaps have
yet been prosecuted for breaking the criminal law. His conclusion is stark:
“Some people go to jail and others just don’t. And we all get it.”149
Federal prosecutions of corporate executives in cases where industrial
practices killed and injured people have the potential to modify this picture.
Federal prosecutors have started to think about launching criminal probes as
soon as they learn about a grave malfeasance that threatens public health,
kills consumers or workers, or damages natural resources. For the sake of
restoring equity in the criminal justice system and deterring what British
sociologist Maure Punch calls “suite violence,” we can only hope these in-
stincts wax rather than wane.150
146 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 10 (1993).
147 Comprehensive statistics on prison populations can be found at the Bureau of Justice
Statistics website. LAUREN E. GLAZE & DANIELLE KAEBLE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ
248479, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2013), http://perma.cc/85WM-
2TAG. For comparative rates, see Joshua Holland, Land of the Free? US Has 25 Percent of the
World’s Prisoners, MOYERS & COMPANY (Dec. 16, 2013), http://perma.cc/VE5K-AX2H.
148 Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEO-
PLE, http://perma.cc/4XRW-PKY8.
149 MATT TAIBBI, THE DIVIDE: AMERICAN INJUSTICE IN THE AGE OF THE WEALTH GAP, at
xix (2014).
150 Maurice Punch, Suite Violence: Why Managers Murder and Corporations Kill, 33
CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 243, 245 (2004).
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